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Introduction
Bank-secrecy laws, low tax rates, and shell companies amassed at P.O.
boxes are some of the common features associated with offshore financial
havens that have catapulted famous vacation destinations in the Caribbean
and elsewhere into magnets for global financial transactions.1 The culprits in
these stories—usually abetted by small offshore jurisdictions facilitating tax
evasion2—range from celebrities, including Mel Gibson and Vivienne West-
wood, to corporations, including Apple and Google.3 While the topic of tax
evasion is nothing new,4 a series of massive document leaks in recent years,
exposing the vast scope and variations of evasion schemes, has propelled
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1. See, e.g., Andrew Ross Sorkin, When It Comes to Tax Avoidance, Donald Trump’s Just
a Small Fry, N.Y. Times: DealBook (Oct. 4, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/04/busi
ness/dealbook/when-it-comes-to-tax-avoidance-donald-trumps-just-a-small-fry.html (on file
with the Michigan Law Review); Storm Survivors, Economist (Feb. 16, 2013), http://www.econ
omist.com/news/special-report/21571549-offshore-financial-centres-have-taken-battering-re
cently-they-have-shown-remarkable [https://perma.cc/5ZUK-EBF9].
2. Scholars typically distinguish tax evasion, a set of illicit activities aimed at reducing
taxes, from tax avoidance, which includes various legal maneuverings. See, e.g., Ronen Palan
et al., Tax Havens: How Globalization Really Works 9–10 (2010). The distinction be-
tween evasion and avoidance is notoriously difficult to ascertain. Pp. 19–20.
3. See Daniel Bukszpan, These Celebrities Shelter Their Wealth in Tax Havens, Fortune
(Apr. 14, 2015), http://fortune.come/2015/04/14/celebrity-tax-havens/ [https://perma.cc/
KAS4-SCWE]; Jonathan Chew, 7 Corporate Giants Accused of Evading Billions in Taxes, For-
tune (Mar. 11, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/03/11/apple-google-taxes-eu/ [https://perma.
cc/A4H9-5MW2].
4. See Ronen Palan, Tax Havens and the Commercialization of State Sovereignty, 56 Int’l
Org. 151, 153 (2002) (tracing the emergence of the “first modern tax havens” to “the last years
of the nineteenth century”).
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multilateral government crackdowns5 and attracted academic interests from
a wide range of disciplines, including economics, international relations, and
the law.
Christopher Bruner’s Re-Imagining Offshore Finance: Market-Dominant
Small Jurisdictions in a Globalizing Financial World6 is a significant contribu-
tion to the literature that should become required reading for both consum-
ers and producers of knowledge concerning the regulation of global financial
transactions. Bruner starts with the observation that “reducing or eliminat-
ing taxes does not itself guarantee the arrival of cross-border capital” (p. 21).
Instead, the handful of small jurisdictions that have become the dominant
players in cross-border finance provide more than just low taxes and bank-
secrecy laws: they offer “cutting-edge regulatory regimes in high value-added
areas of cross-border financial services” (p. 47). Bruner’s careful compara-
tive case studies cut through ideologically charged old labels and reveal sev-
eral important characteristics shared by certain small jurisdictions, like
Bermuda and Singapore, that account for their disproportionate success in
the global market for cross-border finance.7 Bruner terms these jurisdictions
“market-dominant small jurisdictions” (“MDSJs”) (pp. 7–8). There is more
than semantics at play here, for MDSJs have “much to tell us about the
future of financial globalization, territorial sovereignty, and territorial finan-
cial regulation in the twenty-first century” (p. 13).
Descriptively, Bruner’s work provides a compelling account challenging
the all-too-popular scholarly view that conceptualizes small offshore juris-
dictions as parasitic entities that subsist largely at the expense of eroding the
tax base of developed nations.8 To the contrary, Bruner observes that MDSJs
have “promoted innovation in their areas of specialization later emulated by
larger markets, and otherwise enhanced market efficiency within such larger
markets” (p. 224). In doing so, Bruner complicates the debate over the func-
tion of small offshore jurisdictions, which is largely taking place in the ab-
sence of good data.
This Review situates Bruner’s contribution to the literature examining
the regulation of cross-border finance and highlights the import of Bruner’s
book for thinking about the complex (and contested) relationship between
territorially configured domestic laws and the increasingly liberal movement
of capital. Part I sets out the book’s central thesis. I highlight Bruner’s novel
framework, which identifies the factors that propel certain small jurisdic-
tions into becoming magnets for cross-border finance. I also outline the lim-
its of this framework in accounting for the stability in the overall demand
for the commercialization of sovereignty. Part II examines the rise of MDSJs
5. See, e.g., Stephen Castle, E.U.’s Five Biggest Economies Join Tax Crackdown After Pan-
ama Papers, N.Y. Times (Apr. 15, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/16/business/inter
national/panama-papers-europe.html?_r=0 (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
6. Christopher Bruner is a Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law.
7. See pp. 7–8, 41–50.
8. For a seminal account, see Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and
the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1575, 1578–79 (2000).
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and other offshore jurisdictions as they relate to the territorially configured
domestic rules—a subject that has yet to attract the attention that it de-
serves. While Bruner views the rise of MDSJs as typifying the continued
dominance of territorial sovereignty, I show that it is a reflection of a new
jurisprudential tendency that deemphasizes the relationship between soil
and the law. This understanding has significant implications, because small
offshore jurisdictions, intentionally or not, increasingly supply templates of
substantive and procedural law that govern cross-border finance and replace
and reconstitute territorially configured domestic rules. Here, I develop a
paradigm conceptualizing tax havens as “producers” of corporate law and
start a discussion about the normative desirability of this emerging trend.
I. Capital Mobility and the Winners of Cross-Border Finance
A. Market-Dominant Small Jurisdictions
Delaware maintains a preeminent status in corporate law. In the United
States, corporate law—the body of law governing the relations between the
firm’s shareholders and managers—is largely a matter of state law.9 Under
the internal affairs doctrine, firms choose their state of incorporation for
statutory domicile “independent of physical presence.”10 This system sets up
a competition between states to supply corporate law—one that has been
dubbed the central building block underlying the “genius of American cor-
porate law.”11
It was not always like this. Before the merger movement in the late nine-
teenth century, corporate activities were primarily local, and corporate law
was largely monopolized by the state where the corporation conducted its
business. Capital mobility and the growth of interstate business effectively
broke this monopoly since “[l]egislatures could not afford to . . . driv[e]
business out of state to the detriment of local interests.”12 Delaware has been
the clear winner in this “race” enabled by regulatory competition.13 Not-
withstanding the state’s status as one of the smallest states in the United
9. Roberta Romano, The Genius of American Corporate Law 1–3 (1993).
10. Roberta Romano, Competition for Corporate Charters and the Lesson of Takeover Stat-
utes, 61 Fordham L. Rev. 843, 843 (1993). The internal affairs doctrine “is a conflict of laws
principle which recognizes that only one State should have the authority to regulate a corpora-
tion’s internal affairs—matters peculiar to the relationships among or between the corporation
and its current officers, directors, and shareholders.” Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645
(1982).
11. Romano, supra note 9, at 1.
12. Frederick Tung, Before Competition: Origins of the Internal Affairs Doctrine, 32 J.
Corp. L. 33, 45–46 (2006).
13. Scholars vigorously disagree about whether this reflects a “race for the bottom” or a
race to the top. Compare William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon
Delaware, 83 Yale L.J. 663, 705 (1974) (describing American corporate law as encouraging a
“race for the bottom”), with Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the
Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. Legal Stud. 251, 256 (1977) (offering a race-to-the-top
account).
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States (both by land mass and population) (p. 175), Delaware is the juridical
home to “more than half of all U.S. publicly traded companies and 65 per-
cent of Fortune 500,”14 only two of which are physically headquartered in
Delaware (p. 181). Delaware derives a substantial portion of its government
revenue from the incorporation business (p. 176) and works hard to retain
its competitive advantage in producing cutting-edge corporate law. The Del-
aware General Corporation Law is a byproduct of “a decidedly cooperative
public-private undertaking” (p. 183), while some of the country’s most re-
nowned experts in business law staff its judiciary (pp. 183–84).
Delaware is just one of a handful of small jurisdictions that Bruner iden-
tifies as the dominant players in cross-border finance—broadly defined to
include insurance, Islamic finance, private wealth management, cross-border
banking, and incorporation services (p. 7 n.19). Bruner identifies the follow-
ing characteristics shared by MDSJs: (1) they are “poorly endowed with nat-
ural resources,” creating a strong incentive to convert their main asset—the
ability to write laws—to attract foreign capital; (2) they can exercise legisla-
tive autonomy, which need not be full sovereignty recognized under interna-
tional law; (3) they are culturally and geographically proximate to major
economic powers; (4) they are rich in human capital and professional net-
works; and (5) they maintain credibility with the private sector through a
mix of collaboration and oversight (pp. 43–47; emphasis omitted). These
factors, Bruner claims, reveal six paradigmatic jurisdictions that cut across
differences in geographies, cultural affinities, and legal traditions: Bermuda,
Delaware, Dubai, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Switzerland.15 According to
Bruner, these jurisdictions are “not merely successful, but literally globally
dominant in specialized areas of cross-border finance” (p. 9).
Consider the fascinating case of Bermuda, an island roughly one-third
the size of Washington, D.C., widely recognized as one of the largest centers
for insurance and risk management in the world (pp. 51–52). Bermuda
squarely fits the MDSJ paradigm. Despite being a territory of the United
Kingdom (voluntarily), the island wields substantial legislative autonomy,
enabled by the United Kingdom’s broad delegation of authority (p. 45). Ber-
muda has used this autonomy to develop some of the essential ingredients
for its success—“substantial investment in human and institutional capital
catering to cross-border finance, as well as the development of a competitive
regulatory regime in close coordination with the private sector” (p. 56). As
Bruner sees it, the legislature’s “business-friendly capacity to innovate” has
played a significant role in the island’s economic development (pp. 56–58).
Today, this island with a population of less than 100,000 people (p. 52) is
14. Jeffrey W. Bullock, Del. Sec’y of State, Delaware Division of Corporations
2013 Annual Report 2 (2014), https://corp.delaware.gov/Corporations_2013%20Annual%20
Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/E525-6D32].
15. As implied by Bruner, these jurisdictions are not the only jurisdictions that would fit
the MDSJ paradigm. P. 10 (“I have consciously chosen six jurisdictions that differ
substantially . . . .”).
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home to “subsidiaries of 75% of the Fortune 100,”16 while controlling a
dominant share of insurance policies connected to the United States and
elsewhere—evidenced by the significant growth in disputes arising under
the famous “Bermuda Form” policy insurances.17
Singapore, a small island nation in Southeast Asia almost 10,000 miles
away from Bermuda, shares similar traits. Despite being one of the smallest
independent states, Singapore has come to dominate the wealth-manage-
ment industry, even while the industry in the “United States and Europe
grapple with the worst slump in a generation.”18 Bruner attributes Singa-
pore’s ascendance in large measure to deliberate state policies adopted in the
latter half of the twentieth century, aimed at developing the infrastructure
broadly resonant with the MDSJ concept (pp. 115–21). This includes main-
taining some of “the least restrictive immigration laws in Asia for foreign
talent,”19 and a regulatory environment that is said to be closely attuned to
the interests of the private sector (pp. 129, 132). Today, this island nation
with a land mass about twice the size of Detroit20 is “the world’s fastest-
growing wealth management center . . . and its share of global offshore
wealth is expected to outstrip Switzerland by 2020.”21
To be sure, MDSJs do offer attractive tax rates, usually combined with
some form of bank-secrecy laws, as critics of tax havens have pointed out.
Bermuda offers “no corporate or capital gains taxes”;22 Dubai generally le-
vies “no direct taxes on corporate profits or personal income” on net profit
16. Foreign & Commonwealth Office, The Overseas Territories: Security, Suc-
cess and Sustainability, 2012, Cm. 8374, at 92 (UK).
17. Bermuda Form Dispute Resolution Experience, K&L Gates, http://www.klgates.com/
files/Uploads/Documents/Global_Insurance/Bermuda_Form_Dispute_Resolution.pdf [https://
perma.cc/P79Q-8B32].
18. Neil Chatterjee & John O’Donnell, Wealth Management Prospers in Singapore, N.Y.
Times (Nov. 14, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/14/business/worldbusiness/14iht-
singapore.1.18654227.html (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
19. P. 132 (quoting Jek Aun Long & Danny Tan, The Growth of the Private Wealth Man-
agement Industry in Singapore and Hong Kong, 6 Cap. Markets L.J. 104, 116–17 (2011)).
20. See Detroit Future City, 139 Square Miles (2017), https://detroitfuturecity.com/
wp-content/uploads/2017/09/DFC_139-SQ-Mile_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/QR7D-YQ27]
(showing Detroit spans 139 square miles); Land Area (Sq. Km.), World Bank: Data, https://
data.worldbank.org/indicator/AG.LND.TOTL.K2 [https://perma.cc/K4YH-WHQN] (showing
Singapore spans 273 square miles).
21. Sophie Song, Singapore, Now World’s Fastest Growing Wealth Management Hub, Not
Free from Tax Evasion and Other Crimes, Int’l Bus. Times (Feb. 18, 2014, 10:40 AM), http://
www.ibtimes.com/singapore-now-worlds-fastest-growing-wealth-management-hub-not-free-
tax-evasion-other-1556309 [https://perma.cc/8N69-8NLR].
22. P. 57 (quoting Bermuda: Country Profile, Bus. Berm. Rev., 2012, at 19, 22).
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generated outside of Dubai;23 Singapore offers full tax exemption for for-
eign-sourced income,24 with strict bank confidentiality laws that carry crimi-
nal penalty for breaches (pp. 126–27); Hong Kong famously levies “no sales,
withholding, capital gains, dividends, or estate taxes” (p. 137); Switzerland
offers “competitive” tax rates and hallmark bank-secrecy law codified in its
constitution (pp. 164, 166–67); and Delaware levies no corporate income tax
on goods and services provided by Delaware corporations operating outside
of Delaware (p. 187).
But so do a lot of other small jurisdictions—including Nauru, Niue,
Palau, Samoa, and Vanuatu, to name a few—that come nowhere close to the
success enjoyed by MDSJs (pp. 195–96). The small South Pacific island na-
tion of Nauru, for instance, occupying one of the great phosphate-rock is-
lands, looked to cross-border finance as a source of government revenue in
the face of dwindling phosphate sales (pp. 193–94). In the late 1990s, the
island attracted considerable criminal money—including $70 billion of Rus-
sian mafia money and hundreds of “fictional” banks with no physical exis-
tence (p. 194). But with its refusal to comply with multilateral anti-money-
laundering initiatives in the early 2000s, the island’s share of the global mar-
ket for offshore finance quickly dissipated (pp. 194–96). The problem, as
Bruner sees it, is that jurisdictions like Nauru fail to invest in infrastructure
and resort to copying and pasting legislation from other jurisdictions, which
results in little competitive advantage (pp. 195–96).
MDSJs offer something different than the garden variety of tax havens
that fail to maintain stability or dominance in the global market for cross-
border finance—something at least partially backed up, according to
Bruner, by the fact that “diplomatic and legal pressures that have arisen
since the 1990s have not fundamentally eroded the MDSJs’ advantages”
(p. 225).
B. Limits of the MDSJ Concept
Bruner’s book is largely an effort to establish a causal claim: that the
salient characteristics shared by MDSJs account for their extraordinary suc-
cess in cross-border finance. It is, therefore, unsurprising that Bruner re-
mains optimistic in predicting that “small jurisdictions that have profited
predominantly through abusive practices will ultimately fail as global stan-
dards steadily improve” (p. 236).
This view finds support from recent work by legal scholars and econo-
mists who argue that small offshore jurisdictions enable jurisdictional com-
petition, ultimately resulting in efficient and desirable regulatory regimes.
23. P. 81 (quoting Dubai Economy, Gov’t Dubai, http://dubai.ae/en/aboutdubai/pages/
dubaieconomy.aspx [https://perma.cc/H5GE-A9PN]).
24. Generally, nation-states tax on one of two bases, source or residence. Jurisdictions
differ on how to tax income from other jurisdictions. For a general overview on the concept of
foreign-sourced income, see Edward D. Kleinbard, The Lessons of Stateless Income, 65 Tax L.
Rev. 99 (2011).
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For instance, Jonathan Macey and Anna Manasco Dionne argue that regula-
tory competition between offshore jurisdictions and developed economies
leads to increased innovation in regulatory rules because onshore jurisdic-
tions are forced to offer more competitive transaction costs through the re-
duction of regulations and the use of financial innovations.25 Others write
“in praise of tax havens,” using economic models to assess that fears of a
“race to the bottom” in corporate tax rates may be misplaced.26
While Bruner attempts to avoid taking sides on the policy merits of
jurisdictional tax competition (p. 35), the MDSJ concept, to a certain extent,
inescapably clashes with the tax-haven literature that predominantly por-
trays small jurisdictions as “parasites” of larger jurisdictions, insinuating
their non-value-added function.27 Embedded in the tax-haven literature is
the belief that small cash-strapped jurisdictions—acutely vulnerable to cap-
ture by nonmajoritarian interest groups—introduce the potential for a race
to the bottom in tax rates and regulations.28
In my view, both accounts reflect accurate morsels of descriptive reality.
Bruner is correct to observe, as are race-to-the-top proponents, that small
jurisdictions cannot achieve and sustain this measure of success without
heavy investment in a wide range of institutional-capacity building. Those
investments may in some cases lead to jurisdictional competition, resulting
in innovative rules that govern cross-border financial activities.
But that causal relationship does not necessarily indicate that the ab-
sence of the independent variable would lead to failure. This is true espe-
cially if one starts looking at the internal political dimensions of various
small jurisdictions. Importantly, not all small jurisdictions benefit from in-
vesting in the type of infrastructure that can lead to long-term economic
development, at least from the point of view of the ruling elite. This is the
endemic problem of agency: the interests of the ruling elite do not necessa-
rily align with the interests of the local population.29 Where there appears to
be a severe agency problem, it may be just as lucrative from the point of
view of the ruling elite to “commercialize sovereignty.”30 Such commerciali-
zation is similar to ways in which state leaders across sub-Saharan Africa,
25. Anna Manasco Dionne & Jonathan R. Macey, Offshore Finance and Onshore Markets:
Racing to the Bottom, or Moving Toward Efficient?, in Offshore Financial Centers and
Regulatory Competition 8, 8–10 (Andrew P. Morriss ed., 2010).
26. E.g., Qing Hong & Michael Smart, In Praise of Tax Havens: International Tax Planning
and Foreign Direct Investment, 54 Eur. Econ. Rev. 82, 83–84 (2010).
27. See, e.g., Joel Slemrod & John D. Wilson, Tax Competition with Parasitic Tax Havens,
93 J. Pub. Econ. 1261, 1262 (2009).
28. Palan et al., supra note 2, at 158–59.
29. See Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, The Limits of International Law 4–5
(2005) (comparing the state to a corporation subject to agency costs).
30. See Palan, supra note 4, at 153 (describing how historical trends of political fragmen-
tation and the internationalization of capital have enabled states to commercialize
sovereignty).
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Latin America, and Southeast Asia have profited from “selling off” land to
multinational corporations, largely at the expense of the local population.31
Noticeably absent from Bruner’s sampling are small jurisdictions like
Liberia and Panama that are active in the global market for cross-border
finance without reaching the extraordinary level of success enjoyed by
MDSJs.32 Indeed, these jurisdictions may precisely be the jurisdictions whose
“core business consists of charging rent or license fees in return for granting
firms a right to incorporate in their jurisdictions.”33
There are also important reasons to be skeptical about the effectiveness
of multilateral crackdowns. For instance, a recent study by Niels Johannesen
and Gabriel Zucman found that an increase in multilateral regulatory coor-
dination and crackdown on tax havens resulted in “tax evaders shift[ing]
deposits to havens not covered by a treaty with their home country. The
crackdown thus caused a relocation of deposits at the benefit of the least
compliant havens.”34 Indeed, because closing down a subset of tax havens
will make it more lucrative for the remaining havens, “renegade” jurisdic-
tions are likely to thrive even in the era of heightened multilateral
coordination.35
With that said, this shortcoming does not detract from the book’s major
achievements. The MDSJ concept provokes a thoughtful line of inquiry into
thinking about the role of small offshore jurisdictions in relation to the ex-
isting, territorially configured domestic regulatory laws in a landscape where
31. The recent “land grab” phenomenon involving corrupt state leaders selling or leasing
large-scale agricultural land to foreign entities is an example of this dynamic. Lea Brilmayer &
William J. Moon, Regulating Land Grabs: Third Party States, Social Activism and International
Law, in Rethinking Food Systems: Structural Challenges, New Strategies and the
Law 123, 124–25 (Nadia C.S. Lambek et al. eds., 2014).
32. To be sure, Bruner also examines large and successful jurisdictions—principally New
York and London—to further illuminate the boundaries of MDSJs’ explanatory domain
(p. 192). This effort, however, does not persuasively establish a negative causal inference.
Bruner readily admits that his small sample of failed jurisdictions alone “hardly provide[s] a
robust test of [his] causal hypotheses” (p. 192). To be fair, there is an inevitable tension be-
tween supplying a sufficient number of case studies to venture causal claims and focusing in
on a manageable number that one can treat in sufficient depth and sophistication. It is my
hope that Bruner’s provocative thesis, laden with careful case studies, inspires further aca-
demic investigation.
33. Ronen Palan, The Offshore World: Sovereign Markets, Virtual Places, and
Nomad Millionaires 83 (2006).
34. Niels Johannesen & Gabriel Zucman, The End of Bank Secrecy? An Evaluation of the
G20 Tax Haven Crackdown, Am. Econ. J., Feb. 2014, at 65, 65.
35. See May Elsayyad & Kai A. Konrad, Fighting Multiple Tax Havens, 86 J. Int’l Econ.
295, 295 (2012) (“Closing down a subset of tax havens reduces competition among the havens
that remain active. This makes their ‘tax haven business’ more profitable and shifts a larger
share of rents to these remaining tax havens, making them more reluctant to give up their ‘tax
haven business.’ ”). The effectiveness of recently enacted Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act
(FATCA), which imposes reporting obligations regarding offshore accounts and assets for U.S.
tax payers and certain financial institutions, also remains to be seen. See generally Young Ran
(Christine) Kim, Considering “Citizenship Taxation”: In Defense of FATCA, 20 Fla. Tax Rev.
335, 359–67 (2017) (noting the various merits of and concerns associated with the FATCA).
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financial transactions increasingly implicate the interests of multiple juris-
dictions. What makes his contribution particularly important, in my view, is
his short but provocative discussion about the future of territorial regula-
tions in an era of unprecedented capital mobility. This is a topic that only
receives brief attention in Bruner’s book, and a concept that I develop in
Part II.
II. Territorial Sovereignty and Global Finance
The prevailing account in the literature tends to conceptualize tax
havens as vehicles used by corporations and high net-worth individuals
(“HNWI”) to escape otherwise applicable domestic tax liabilities.36 This line
of thought owes its intellectual debt to scholars who view the growth of
cross-border commerce—along with a private system of governance devel-
oped outside of the sphere of state intervention37—as undermining territo-
rial sovereignty, or even rendering it antiquated.38
Bruner views capital mobility’s impact on territorial sovereignty as
“double-edged” (p. 234). To Bruner, the ability of MDSJs to attract business
is “profoundly dependent upon territorially defined financial regulatory au-
thority” (p. 18). It is for this reason Bruner predicts that “there are powerful
and well-endowed constituencies with strong incentives to maintain territo-
rial financial regulation—and, accordingly, territorial sovereignty itself”
(pp. 234–35).
This assessment is too crude, in my view, because it underappreciates
that much of the success of MDSJs is attributable to the nonterritorial na-
ture of global financial transactions and the fictional character of small off-
shore jurisdictions.39 Indeed, perhaps the single most important reason for
the success of tax havens “lie[s] in their ability to provide protection from
national regulation and taxation without the need to physically relocate to
the host country.”40 That is, unlike territorially connected productive activi-
ties that define other industries—land-based agriculture and the extractives
36. See, e.g., Stephen J. Kobrin, Economic Governance in an Electronically Networked
Global Economy, in The Emergence of Private Authority in Global Governance 43, 45,
56 (Rodney Bruce Hall & Thomas J. Biersteker eds., 2002).
37. For an excellent commentary of transnational private regulation in the financial de-
rivatives market context, see Gabriel V. Rauterberg & Andrew Verstein, Assessing Transnational
Private Regulation of the OTC Derivatives Market: ISDA, the BBA, and the Future of Financial
Reform, 54 Va. J. Int’l L. 9 (2013).
38. E.g., Peter Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International
Law 7 (7th rev. ed. 1997); Kal Raustiala, The Evolution of Territoriality: International Relations
and American Law, in Territoriality and Conflict in an Age of Globalization 219,
219–21 (Miles Kahler & Barbara F. Walter eds., 2006); Alec Stone Sweet, The New Lex Mer-
catoria and Transnational Governance, 13 J. Eur. Pub. Pol’y 627 (2006).
39. To be fair to Bruner, this point is not developed at length in the book. Moreover, the
book should be credited for successfully responding to the more extreme claims in the global-
ization literature that argue the effect that technological advancement enabling “frictionless
transfers of money” is essentially erasing “geography.” Pp. 16–18.
40. Palan, supra note 4, at 163.
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industry would be paradigmatic examples—cross-border finance is legally
constituted. As Katharina Pistor notes in her legal theory of finance, “Finan-
cial assets are contracts the value of which depends in large part on their
legal vindication.”41 Financial instruments and legal regimes are intercon-
nected, in that “the rules that establish the game are continuously challenged
by new contractual devices, which in turn seek legal vindication.”42
For this reason, I offer a different theoretical account concerning the
complicated relationship between territorial sovereignty and cross-border fi-
nance. To the extent that small offshore jurisdictions offer a way for corpo-
rations and HNWIs to escape territorial laws of a state without having to
physically exit the territory of that state, the rapid ascendance of these juris-
dictions in cross-border finance may not be a reflection of territorial sover-
eignty’s enduring reign. Rather, this ascent may be attributable to certain
segments of territorially configured rules ceding to privately curated juridical
constructs, ironically in the name of territorial sovereignty.43 That is, it is the
growing acceptance of private choice that seeks to exploit the juridical sover-
eignty of small offshore jurisdictions that more accurately describes the ris-
ing preeminence of tax havens. The rise of small offshore jurisdictions,
therefore, ought to also be understood as the tendency to deemphasize the
relationship between soil and the law.
This understanding has significant doctrinal and theoretical implica-
tions largely unrecognized in the existing literature. The most obvious cases
of territorial rules being abandoned are in the areas of corporate law and
laws tertiary to corporate law, largely owing to the increasing frequency with
which corporate entities choose to incorporate in small offshore jurisdic-
tions. As summed up by Lorraine Eden and Robert T. Kudrle, nearly all
Caribbean and Pacific tax havens “are also headquarters havens insofar as
the low value-added activity is not a subsidiary of a foreign firm but is inde-
pendent and legally based in the haven.”44
While private entities’ desire to secure low tax rates may primarily drive
this structure, the effect may be much more than simply shortchanging the
Internal Revenue Service. It has resulted in the transformation of offshore
41. Katharina Pistor, A Legal Theory of Finance, 41 J. Comp. Econ. 315, 315 (2013).
42. Id.
43. Cf. Ronen Palan, Offshore and the Structural Enablement of Sovereignty, in Offshore
Finance Centers and Tax Havens: The Rise of Global Capital 18, 20 (Mark P. Hampton
& Jason P. Abbott eds., 1999) (explaining that offshore both maintains the state system and
removes the threats of state regulation and taxation, “all done in the name of and by the state
system itself”).
44. Lorraine Eden & Robert T. Kudrle, Tax Havens: Renegade States in the International
Tax Regime?, 27 Law & Pol’y 100, 102 (2005). Incorporation in tax-haven jurisdictions does
not necessarily mean that the entity conducts business in that jurisdiction. See, e.g., Andrew
Willins, Shareholder Disputes in the British Virgin Islands, Appleby Resol. Newsl. (Appleby,
Hamilton, Berm.), Q1 2014, at 1, 1, http://www.applebyglobal.com/publication-pdf/article/
2014/shareholder-disputes-in-the-bvi-(andrew-willins)-february-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/
LVZ9-5573] (explaining that the British Virgin Islands is a popular holding company jurisdic-
tion “through which joint venture parties will often co-operate in ventures far removed from
the shores of the British Virgin Islands”).
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financial havens into producers of laws governing cross-border finance. Be-
low, I use recent developments in corporate law and bankruptcy law to show
that the deterritorialization of domestic laws governing certain financial
transactions is already taking place, albeit not without resistance.
A. Corporate Law
Before courts began to articulate the internal affairs doctrine in the
1860s, firms had little choice about where to incorporate because states typi-
cally required domestic corporations “to maintain economic ties with the
state.”45 The growing mobility of businesses effectively ended the state’s mo-
nopoly to impose its laws on corporations doing business in their state.46
Instead, capital mobility established and facilitated the modern charter com-
petition, effectively deterritorializing corporate law.47 Thus, corporate law is
perhaps the most salient example where the tension between territorial laws
and private choice has been resolved largely in favor of juridical private
choice over territoriality.48
While the internal affairs doctrine developed in the domestic context
and is predominantly discussed in terms of interstate relations, federal and
state courts are increasingly extending the doctrine to firms incorporated
outside of the United States. Although largely unrecognized in the extant
literature,49 this extension is important because foreign jurisdictions man-
date significantly different rules governing shareholder rights relative to ones
available under domestic law.
One salient example is the minority investor’s right to bring a derivative
suit—a lawsuit on behalf of the corporate entity for alleged wrongdoing to
investors, enforcing a right that the managing members have refused to as-
sert.50 Because derivative suits fall under the categories of relationships
deemed to be the “internal affairs” of a corporate entity, courts typically
look to the law of the entity’s state of incorporation to determine the appli-
cable law.51
45. Tung, supra note 12, at 44.
46. See id. at 60.
47. See id. at 97–100 (summarizing the preconditions, including corporate mobility, that
were crucial in enabling such competition).
48. See Larry E. Ribstein & Erin Ann O’Hara, Corporations and the Market for Law, 2008
U. Ill. L. Rev. 661.
49. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, The Race for the Bottom in Corporate Governance, 95
Va. L. Rev. 685, 698 (2009) (“[I]t is much harder to remove capital from the United States as a
whole, and this country does not recognize an internal-affairs doctrine in its dealings with
other nations.”).
50. For a general overview, see Daniel R. Fischel & Michael Bradley, The Role of Liability
Rules and the Derivative Suit in Corporate Law: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 71 Cor-
nell L. Rev. 261 (1986).
51. See, e.g., Stephenson v. Citco Grp. Ltd., 700 F. Supp. 2d 599, 608 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)
(“When deciding issues of ‘shareholder standing,’ that is, whether claims should be brought
directly or derivatively, courts must look to the law of the fund’s state of incorporation.”
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Extending the internal affairs doctrine internationally is consequential
since many foreign jurisdictions—including tax havens—severely limit de-
rivative actions. Consider the case of Winn ex rel. Scottish Re Group Ltd. v.
Schafer,52 which involved Scottish Re, the second-largest reinsurer in the
United States,53 incorporated in the Cayman Islands.54 A shareholder
brought a derivative action against Scottish Re’s officers and directors for
“breach of fiduciary duties arising out of alleged misrepresentations as to the
Company’s business.”55 Despite Scottish Re’s irrefutable ties to the United
States—evidenced by the shareholder’s allegations that Scottish Re main-
tained several offices in the United States and that U.S. investors owned a
majority of Scottish Re’s outstanding shares—Scottish Re’s incorporation in
the Cayman Islands proved to be fatal to the shareholder’s suit.56 Citing the
internal affairs doctrine, the court applied Cayman Islands law, which pri-
marily looks to English common law for guidance.57 This severely limited the
shareholder’s rights because, under English law, “derivative claims are
owned and controlled by the company, not its shareholders, and that a
shareholder is not permitted to bring a derivative action on behalf of that
company.”58
To be sure, the applicability of the internal affairs doctrine outside of the
United States is not a settled issue. Indeed, some courts have refused to apply
the internal affairs doctrine internationally to small offshore jurisdictions on
grounds that there is insufficient nexus between the incorporation jurisdic-
tion and the litigants.59 But courts in recent years have increasingly extended
(quoting Debussy LLC v. Deutsche Bank AG, No. 05 Civ. 5550(SHS), 2006 WL 800956, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2006), aff’d, 242 F. App’x 735 (2d Cir. 2007))).
52. 499 F. Supp. 2d 390 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
53. Verified Shareholders’ Derivative Complaint for Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Abuse of
Control, Gross Mismanagement, Unjust Enrichment and Constructive Fraud Seeking Equita-
ble Relief and Damages ¶ 1, Winn, 499 F. Supp. 2d 390 (No. 06-CV-10170), 2006 WL 3669780,
at *2 [hereinafter Complaint].
54. Winn, 499 F. Supp. 2d at 392.
55. Id.
56. Complaint, supra note 53, ¶¶ 7–8.
57. Winn, 499 F. Supp. 2d at 393.
58. Id. at 396.
59. See, e.g., UBS Sec. LLC v. Highland Capital Mgmt., L.P., No. 650097/2009, 2011 WL
781481, at *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 1, 2011) (“Application of the law of New York is also man-
dated on the ground that SOHC has almost no ties to the Cayman Islands. . . . Other than
being incorporated in the Cayman Islands, SOHC has no obvious ties to that jurisdiction.”),
aff’d in part, modified in part, 940 N.Y.S.2d 74 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012).
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the internal affairs doctrine to famous tax havens, including the British Vir-
gin Islands,60 the Cayman Islands,61 and the Bahamas.62
These developments ought to give some pause to domestic courts that
mechanically apply the internal affairs doctrine internationally. Of course,
there are reasons to find this emerging jurisprudence unproblematic. Ever
since Roberta Romano wrote an influential piece conceptualizing corporate
law as “products” supplied by states,63 the dominant view in corporate law
presupposes that corporations choose legal systems that are beneficial for
shareholders.64 Under this frame of thought, there appears little reason to
think that increasing the number of “suppliers” competing to provide cor-
porate law would be anything but beneficial, at least from an efficiency
standpoint.
Enter taxation into the equation, and efficiency cannot be assumed.
Here is why: when the tax rate outside of the United States is lower than the
effective rate at home, “taxpayers will prefer international investments over
domestic investments that, but for the tax regime, would provide more effi-
cient returns.”65 This is important because incorporation decisions in the
domestic interstate context do not generally implicate a dramatic altering of
the effective federal or state tax rate, notwithstanding the differences in state
franchise tax fees. Federal income tax is unaffected because firms operating
within the United States must pay federal taxes. State income tax is unaf-
fected because corporations must establish physical presence within a state
to be subject to that state’s tax.66 Incorporation in offshore financial havens
60. See Microsoft Corp. v. Vadem, Ltd., No. C.A. 6940–VCP, 2012 WL 1564155, at *4
(Del. Ch. Apr. 27, 2012) (“[B]ecause Vadem, Ltd. is incorporated under the BVI Business
Companies Act of 2004 . . . [w]hether Microsoft is required to seek leave to bring its derivative
claims depends entirely on BVI law.”), aff’d, 62 A.3d 1224 (Del. 2013) (unpublished table
decision).
61. See Krys v. Aaron, 106 F. Supp. 3d 472, 485 (D.N.J. 2015) (“[B]ecause the disputed
claim concerns alleged acts of a former director in his capacity as a director of a Cayman
corporation, the internal affairs doctrine presumptively requires the application of Cayman
Law.”).
62. NatTel, LLC v. SAC Capital Advisors, LLC, 370 F. App’x 132, 133 (2d Cir. 2006)
(affirming the district court finding that “the law of the Bahamas—where ODC was incorpo-
rated—governed [the] dispute because NatTel’s claims involved matters of internal corporate
governance”).
63. Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L.
Econ. & Org. 225, 225–30, 277–81(1985).
64. See Romano, supra note 9, 14–17; Winter, supra note 13, at 256.
65. Avi-Yonah, supra note 8, at 1578.
66. See R. Todd Ervin, State Taxation of Financial Institutions: Will Physical Presence or
Economic Presence Win the Day?, 19 Va. Tax Rev. 515, 516 (2000) (“Under accepted Com-
merce Clause jurisprudence, a non-domiciliary taxpayer must have established a substantial
nexus with a state in order to be subject to that state’s taxing jurisdiction. States traditionally
relied on the physical presence doctrine to prove the existence of such a nexus and, accord-
ingly, asserted taxing jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary financial institution only when the
institution had established a physical presence within the taxing state.”).
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alters this dynamic because it often entails gaining juridical residence pre-
cisely for the purpose of avoiding or evading domestic taxes.67 When ac-
counting for tax incentives, the fact that consumers of corporate law have
not advocated a replacement of the current system, which is often taken as
the best evidence of the welfare-enhancing effects of jurisdictional competi-
tion,68 cannot be assumed. At the very least, the topic deserves wider schol-
arly scrutiny as to whether a wholesale adoption of the internal affairs
doctrine in the international context is desirable.
B. Bankruptcy Law
Incorporation decisions impact laws beyond corporate governance is-
sues. They have already begun to reshape the substantive and procedural law
applicable in international insolvency law, a body of law governing creditors
and debtors when corporate entities operating in multiple jurisdictions are
insolvent.69
Traditionally, raw territoriality determined the default bankruptcy law
applicable to corporate entities operating in more than one jurisdiction.
Courts of the United States, for instance, exercised “jurisdiction over those
portions of the company that are within its borders and not those portions
that are outside them.”70 But a relatively recent multilateral initiative
promulgated by the United Nations provides rules on when each jurisdiction
will “recognize” parallel proceedings in a foreign jurisdiction, thereby ena-
bling the law of one jurisdiction to govern assets located
“extraterritorially.”71
In the United States, chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code implements the
initiative, providing rules on when domestic courts will give deference to
foreign insolvency proceedings.72 The code provides that domestic courts
must defer to foreign bankruptcy proceedings where the debtor has its
67. In the international context, the lack of coordination between nation-states enables
“good” corporate tax planning to exempt or indefinitely defer income from taxation by any
particular jurisdiction. See Jane G. Gravelle, Tax Havens: International Tax Avoidance and Eva-
sion, 62 Nat’l Tax J. 727 (2009). Many thanks to Clint Wallace for this insight.
68. Roberta Romano, The States as a Laboratory: Legal Innovation and State Competition
for Corporate Charters, 23 Yale J. on Reg. 209, 211 (2006) (“The output of this competition
has been, for the most part, welfare-enhancing. This contention may be best illustrated by the
fact that consumers of corporate law—investors, managers, and their lobbying organiza-
tions—have not advocated replacing the states’ authority . . . .”).
69. See Sandeep Gopalan & Michael Guihot, Recognition and Enforcement in Cross-Border
Insolvency Law: A Proposal for Judicial Gap-Filling, 48 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 1225, 1226
(2015).
70. Lynn M. LoPucki, The Case for Cooperative Territoriality in International Bankruptcy,
98 Mich. L. Rev. 2216, 2218 (2000).
71. Ad Hoc Group of Vitro Noteholders v. Vitro S.A.B. de C.V. (In re Vitro S.A.B. de
C.V.), 701 F.3d 1031, 1043 (5th Cir. 2012).
72. Congress enacted chapter 15 in 2005 to “implement the Model Law on Cross–Border
Insolvency . . . formulated by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law.”
Id. Chapter 15 defines foreign insolvency proceeding as “a collective judicial or administrative
proceeding in a foreign country . . . under a law relating to insolvency . . . in which . . . the
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“center of . . . main interests” (“COMI”) in the foreign jurisdiction.73 This is
important because recognition under chapter 15 allows the debtor to recover
any claims against or any assets of the entities “located within the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States.”74
Chapter 15 jurisprudence has resulted in tax havens’ transformation
into producers of law that govern cross-border insolvency proceedings, in
part because of the high number of private entities choosing to incorporate
in those jurisdictions.75 Under chapter 15, “the debtor’s registered office,” or
the address designated in a corporation’s incorporation papers,76 “is pre-
sumed to be the center of the debtor’s main interests.”77 While this pre-
sumption is rebuttable, the difficulty in determining other factors has often
resulted in courts’ deferring to that presumption. As Lynn LoPucki observes,
“[T]hroughout most of the world, a debtor corporation’s country of incor-
poration is considered an appropriate venue—if not the appropriate
venue—for the corporation’s bankruptcy case.”78
This is especially true because legal formalities may permit a juridical
center of operations appear to be in a particular jurisdiction using little
more than glorified paperwork. Consider how Bermuda, an island with a
tiny workforce, became a world-renowned hub for the reinsurance industry,
the business of insurance for insurers (p. 59). Importantly, the insurance
industry relies heavily on nonemployee agents and brokers, to the point
where the insurer typically has no direct customer relationship with the in-
sured. Under a practice known as “fronting,” for instance, the “insurer sys-
tematically cedes most of its insurance exposure to a reinsurer (typically in a
different jurisdiction).”79 As Edward Kleinbard notes, “[A] reinsurer can in
fact have a commercial presence in the primary insurer’s jurisdiction
through the retention of an agent of independent status, thereby facilitating
its reinsurance business in respect of risks in that jurisdiction.”80 Obviously,
this has important tax consequences, because domestically controlled insur-
ance companies owned by Bermudian parent companies reduce the tax bur-
den on their insurance activities without bringing the foreign parent
assets and affairs of the debtor are subject to control or supervision by a foreign court, for the
purpose of reorganization or liquidation.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(23) (2012).
73. 11 U.S.C. § 1517(b)(1) (mandating courts recognize foreign bankruptcy proceedings
filed in the debtor’s “center of . . . main interests”); id. § 1520 (listing the consequences of
recognition).
74. In re Gerova Fin. Grp., Ltd., 482 B.R. 86, 88 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012).
75. See Gravelle, supra note 67, at 741 (reporting that the British Virgin Islands is a
country with over 400,000 registered corporations).
76. See, e.g., In re Tri-Cont’l Exch. Ltd., 349 B.R. 627, 635 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2006) (using
“the registered office” and “place of incorporation” interchangeably).
77. 11 U.S.C. § 1516(c).
78. Lynn M. LoPucki, Courting Failure: How Competition for Big Cases Is Cor-
rupting the Bankruptcy Courts 196 (2005).
79. Edward D. Kleinbard, Competitive Convergence in the Financial Services Markets,
Taxes, Mar. 2003, at 225, 236.
80. Id.
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companies into the U.S. net-income tax system.81 But this operational struc-
ture also has important doctrinal implications under chapter 15, because it
has resulted in the laws of small offshore jurisdictions, including the laws of
Bermuda, governing insolvency proceedings of corporate entities with sub-
stantial connections to the United States.
Consider the case of In re Gerova Financial Group, Ltd., a chapter 15
proceeding involving two limited liability companies registered in Bermuda
under the Bermuda Companies Act.82 Gerova was an investment company
with significant assets in the United States specializing in acquiring “illiquid
hedge fund assets, which it planned to use as capital for insurance regulatory
purposes.”83 Following a published report by a U.S. securities analyst claim-
ing that the company was a “Ponzi scheme,” Gerova was subject to several
securities suits in the United States, ultimately resulting in Gerova ceasing all
business.84 After creditors petitioned a court in Bermuda to commence
winding-up proceedings, liquidators filed a chapter 15 petition asking the
bankruptcy court in New York to give recognition to the Bermudian insol-
vency proceeding.85 The court granted the petition, notwithstanding the pe-
titioner’s concession in the briefs that the companies were “exempted
companies” under Bermudian law, meaning that they were incorporated for
the purpose of carrying on transactions and activities which are external to
Bermuda.86 The court’s reasoning, which included the observation that Ber-
muda was “the location of its corporate books and records,”87 is revealing,
given the court’s acknowledgment that “Gerova may have had significant
assets in the United States.”88
In re Gerova is hardly an unusual case. Indeed, the jurisprudence’s defer-
ence to foreign bankruptcy proceedings has been bolstered by recent court
decisions treating the relevant time period for COMI determinations as
when the chapter 15 petition is sought. Consider the seminal case of In re
Fairfield Sentry Ltd., involving one of the largest of the “feeder funds” that
invested $7 billion with Bernie Madoff’s firm, Bernard L. Madoff Investment
Securities LLC.89 Sentry was a classic offshore fund, organized under the
laws of the British Virgin Islands (“BVI”) as a vehicle for non-U.S. persons
81. Id.
82. 482 B.R. 86, 88–89 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012).
83. In re Gerova, 482 B.R. at 88–89.
84. Id. at 89.
85. Id. at 89–90.
86. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Verified Petition at 20, In re Gerova, 482 B.R.
86 (No. 12-13641-alg). In other cases, this status triggers courts to find that a genuine issue of
material facts exists as to an entity’s COMI. See, e.g., In re Basis Yield Alpha Fund (Master),
381 B.R. 37, 48 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008).
87. In re Gerova, 482 B.R. at 91.
88. Id. at 89.
89. No. 10 Civ. 7311(GBD), 2011 WL 4357421, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2011), aff’d,
Morning Mist Holdings Ltd. v. Krys (In re Fairfield Sentry Ltd.), 714 F.3d 127, 130 (2d Cir.
2013).
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and tax-exempt U.S. entities to invest in the Madoff fund.90 While the fund
called the BVI its juridical home—meaning that it had its registered office,
registered agent, registered secretary, and corporate documents located in
the BVI—Sentry’s board of directors oversaw the management, with day-to-
day operations handled by an investment manager, Fairfield Greenwich
Group, based in New York.91 Despite these significant U.S. connections, the
Second Circuit affirmed the lower court’s finding that the COMI was the
British Virgin Islands, largely based on the assessment that “the relevant
time period is the time of the chapter 15 petition.”92 In this case, by the time
chapter 15 proceeding was sought, it was a year and a half after the revela-
tion of the notorious Madoff fraud, whereby “the Debtors discontinued the
transfer of funds for investment with [Madoff’s firm] in New York . . . [and
had] no place of business, no management, and no tangible assets located in
the United States.”93 It is revealing, then, that Sentry’s incorporation status
in the BVI—in the absence of routine business activities there during the
insolvency period—pointed towards the BVI as the center of main interest
for chapter 15 purposes.
To be sure, the statutory language in chapter 15 does not conflate COMI
as the place of incorporation, and some courts have refused to recognize
foreign proceedings taking place in offshore jurisdictions merely on the basis
of a corporation’s incorporation situs.94 That being said, bankruptcy courts
in recent years have recognized foreign proceedings in cases involving corpo-
rate entities incorporated in notorious tax havens, including the British Vir-
gin Islands,95 Bermuda,96 and the Cayman Islands.97
This development is significant from several perspectives. From an eco-
nomic-efficiency point of view, the deterritorialization of bankruptcy law
may not be news to bemoan about. In a seminal piece, Douglas Baird and
Thomas Jackson famously articulate the goal of bankruptcy law as enhanc-
ing the collection efforts of those “who, outside of bankruptcy, have prop-
erty rights in the assets of the firm.”98 To the extent that privileging a
corporation’s juridical residence helps move the international insolvency
system towards a so-called universalist system—where a debtor’s “home
90. In re Fairfield, 2011 WL 4357421, at *1.
91. Morning Mist Holdings Ltd. v. Krys (In re Fairfield Sentry Ltd.), 714 F.3d 127, 130
(2d Cir. 2013).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 138.
94. See, e.g., In re British Am. Ins. Co., 425 B.R. 884, 914–16 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2010)
(declining to recognize an insolvency proceeding in the Bahamas as foreign main proceeding,
notwithstanding the company’s incorporation under Bahamian law).
95. E.g., Morning Mist Holdings, 714 F.3d at 137–39.
96. E.g., In re Gerova Fin. Grp., Ltd., 482 B.R. 86, 88–89 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012).
97. E.g., In re Bancredit Cayman Ltd. (in Liquidation), No. 07 Civ. 11338(LAK), 2008
WL 919533 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2008).
98. Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment
of Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in Bank-
ruptcy, 51 U. Chi. L. Rev. 97, 103 (1984).
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country” exercises worldwide jurisdiction over its bankruptcy99—offshore
jurisdictions may combat perceived evils like forum shopping. Such evils
that are aggravated by a purely territorial system in which multiple sover-
eigns apply their own laws based on the physical location of each of the
bankrupt entity’s assets.100 Indeed, scholars have argued that certain forms of
private ordering in bankruptcy law may heighten efficiency.101
But efficiency is not the only game in town. For one, the displacement
of domestic bankruptcy laws implicates subversion of the local law’s concep-
tion of procedural justice. In the United States, for instance, civil proceed-
ings are generally matters open to the public, under “a strong presumption
of public access to court records.”102 The right to public access to judicial
documents predates the Constitution103 and is further enshrined in “the
public’s [F]irst [A]mendment right to know about the administration of
justice.”104 Such nonlitigant rights may be subject to erosion under a deter-
ritorialized system of governance. For instance, the creditors in In re Fairfield
objected to the British Virgin Islands proceeding on grounds that it was
“cloaked in secrecy,” and therefore against “U.S. public policy.”105 Although
the BVI liquidation proceeding indeed took place under seal, the Second
Circuit rejected the argument, reasoning that “public summaries have been
made available” and that “restricted access to court documents is not unu-
sual in the BVI.”106
Then, there is also the problem of applying foreign law that may be at
odds with the local law’s conception of distributive justice.107 To be sure, an
efficiency-oriented scholar may view the application of a foreign jurisdic-
tion’s insolvency laws as unproblematic, reasoning that those jurisdictions
would have an incentive to devise insolvency laws with strong creditor pro-
tection in order to make the companies attractive to investors. But this view
takes a rather narrow view of the bankruptcy law’s function. Indeed, the
purpose of bankruptcy law is by no means a settled issue, and it may include
the interests of various stakeholders besides creditors. As Elizabeth Warren
99. LoPucki, supra note 70, at 2220.
100. John A.E. Pottow, The Myth (and Realities) of Forum Shopping in Transnational Insol-
vency, 32 Brook. J. Int’l L. 785, 787–88, 814–16 (2007).
101. Robert K. Rasmussen, Resolving Transnational Insolvencies Through Private Ordering,
98 Mich. L. Rev. 2252, 2275 (2000).
102. Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Orion Pictures Corp. (In re Orion Pictures Corp.),
21 F.3d 24, 26 (2d Cir. 1994) (citing Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597–98
(1978)).
103. United States v. Amodeo, 44 F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 1995).
104. Video Software Dealers Ass’n, 21 F.3d at 26 (explaining that the policy of open access
codified in the Bankruptcy Code “evidences [C]ongress’s strong desire to preserve the public’s
right of access to judicial records in bankruptcy proceedings”).
105. Morning Mist Holdings Ltd. v. Krys (In re Fairfield Sentry Ltd.), 714 F.3d 127, 139
(2d Cir. 2013).
106. Id. at 140.
107. For a seminal work on distributional justice, see Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law
and Distributive Justice, 89 Yale L.J. 472 (1980).
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explains, corporate bankruptcy typically involves a large number of constitu-
encies, owing to the fact that corporations “tend to falter during active,
sometimes frantic, operations, leaving contracts in various states of per-
formance and nonperformance; owing past-due bills along with contingent
future obligations; and disappointing legions of suppliers, employees, cus-
tomers, creditors, and others who fear that they will not get all they had
expected from their dealings with the debtor.”108
It is for this reason that mechanical application of foreign law to insol-
vency proceedings with significant connections to the United States may un-
dermine the function of American bankruptcy policy. As Andrew Dawson
notes, “While haven jurisdictions have an incentive to pass strong creditor
protections in order to make haven-registered companies attractive to inves-
tors, they have little incentive to protect employees, trade creditors, and
other interests impacted by business failures.”109 At the very least, there
needs to be a more honest admittance that much of the normative assess-
ment of the impact of tax havens is contingent on the academic paradigm
one chooses to adopt.
Conclusion
Critics of tax havens are highly attached to the traditional, territorial
view of the world: productive economic activities territorially connected to a
particular jurisdiction bestow that jurisdiction the right to levy taxes for
those activities. Tax havens appear problematic because they upset our sense
of social contract. As Thomas Piketty explains, “[I]f some of the wealthiest
individuals and some of our largest corporations use tax havens and fiscal
dissimulation in such a way that they avoid paying taxes almost entirely,
then it is our basic social contract that is at stake.”110
Christopher Bruner’s book provides a valuable service in showing that
many small offshore jurisdictions—principally MDSJs—add more value
than merely serving as juridical “parking lots” designed to help corporations
and HNWIs evade or avoid taxes. But it also raises some important counter-
vailing considerations, including our jurisprudential tendency to tolerate
private entities that transcend territorially configured domestic legal order-
ing, bootstrapped with lip service to territorial sovereignty.
In this Review, I highlight that small offshore jurisdictions not only al-
low transnational corporations to structure their operations to minimize
taxes, but in doing so become emerging legal hubs producing rules gov-
erning global financial transactions. This necessarily involves the erosion
108. Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policymaking in an Imperfect World, 92 Mich. L. Rev.
336, 343 (1993).
109. Andrew B. Dawson, Offshore Bankruptcies, 88 Neb. L. Rev. 317, 319 (2009).
110. Thomas Piketty, Foreword to Gabriel Zucman, The Hidden Wealth of Nations:
The Scourge of Tax Havens, at vii, viii (Teresa Lavender Fagan trans., 2015).
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and reconstitution of domestic legal ordering. Whether, and what, conse-
quences to society may result from this trend, is an issue of importance
worthy of further scholarly scrutiny.
